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Contracting under Incomplete Information and Social Preferences : An Experimental Study

Hoppe, Eva I.; Schmitz, Patrick W. - 2012

cornerstone of contract theory. We have conducted an experiment with 720 participants to explore whether the theoretical insights … are reflected by the behavior of subjects in the laboratory and to what extent deviations from standard theory can be … agency theory is indeed useful to qualitatively predict how variations in the degree of uncertainty affect subjects' behavior …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014162484

Contracting under incomplete information and social preferences : an experimental study

Hoppe, Eva I.; Schmitz, Patrick W. - In: The review of economic studies 80 (2013) 4, pp. 1516-1544

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010202076

Explicit versus implicit contracts for dividing the benefits of cooperation

Casari, Marco; Cason, Timothy N. - In: Journal of economic behavior & organization : JEBO 85 (2013) 1, pp. 20-34

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009708801

Contracting under incomplete information and social preferences : an experimental study

Hoppe, Eva I.; Schmitz, Patrick W. - 2013

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009713896

Contracts and trust

McCannon, Bryan; Asaad, Colleen Tokar; Wilson, Mark - 2015

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011407290

Rewards and punishments : informal contracting through social preferences

Chassang, Sylvain; Zehnder, Christian - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; journal of the Econometric … 11 (2016) 3, pp. 1145-1179

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011584328

Rewards and punishments : informal contracting through social preferences

Chassang, Sylvain; Zehnder, Christian - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 11 (2016) 3, pp. 1145-1179

This paper develops a positive model of informal contracting in which rewards and punishments are not determined by an ex ante optimal plan but instead express the ex post moral sentiments of the arbitrating party. We consider a subjective performance evaluation problem in which a principal can...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011671838

Reciprocity in dynamic employment relationships

Fahn, Matthias - 2020

This paper analyzes a dynamic relational contract for employees with reciprocal preferences. I develop a tractable model to investigate how “direct” performance-pay (promising a bonus in exchange for effort) and generous upfront wages (which activate the norm of reciprocity) interact over...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012241077

An iIntroduction to other-regarding preferences with an application to contract design

Eira, João - In: Notas económicas 46 (2018), pp. 17-48

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012116144

Unravelling into war : trust and social preferences in Hobbes's state of nature

Schaefer, Alexander; Sohn, Jin-yeong - In: Economics and philosophy 38 (2022) 2, pp. 171-205

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013342646