We design a laboratory experiment to identify whether a preference for randomization defines a stable type across different choice environments. In games and individual decisions, subjects face twenty simultaneous repetitions of the same choice. Subjects can randomize by making different choices...

We examine whether the "Level-k" model of strategic behavior generates reliable cross-game predictions within an individual. We find no correlation in subjects' estimated levels of reasoning across two families of games. Furthermore, estimating a higher level for Ann than Bob in one family of...

We simulate a horse race between several behavioral models of play in one-shot games. First, we find that many models can lead to identical predictions, making it impossible to select a unique winning model. This is largely avoided by comparing only two models. But even then we find that...

We study the design of mechanisms that implement Lindahl or Walrasian allocations and whose Nash equilibria are dynamically stable for a wide class of adaptive dynamics. We argue that supermodularity is not a desirable stability criterion in this mechanism design context, focusing instead on...