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At each moment in time, some alternative from a finite set is selected by a dynamic process. Players observe the alternative selected and sequentially cast a yes or a no vote. If the set of players casting a yes-vote is decisive for the alternative in question, the alternative is accepted and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014158928
It is well-known that a transferable utility game has a non-empty core if and only if it is balanced. In the class of non-transferable utility games balancedness or the more general pi-balancedness due to Billera (1970) is a sufficient, but not a necessary condition for the core to be non-empty....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014113483
We consider a class of perfect information unanimity bargaining games, where the players have to choose a payoff vector from a fixed set of feasible payoffs. The proposer and the order of the responding players is determined by a state that evolves stochastically over time. The probability...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014145019
We consider n–player perfect information games with payoff functions having a finite image. We do not make any further assumptions, so in particular we refrain from making assumptions on the cardinality or the topology of the set of actions and assumptions like continuity or measurability of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013020588
We study subgame φ-maxmin strategies in two-player zero-sum stochastic games with finite action spaces and a countable state space. Here φ denotes the tolerance function, a function which assigns a non-negative tolerated error level to every subgame. Subgame φ-maxmin strategies are strategies...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012912409
We study games with almost perfect information and an infinite time horizon. In such games, at each stage, the players simultaneously choose actions from finite action sets, knowing the actions chosen at all previous stages. The payoff of each player is a function of all actions chosen during...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012894605
We study the division of a surplus under majoritarian bargaining in the three-person case. In a stationary equilibrium as derived by Baron and Ferejohn (1989), the proposer offers one third times the discount factor of the surplus to a second player and allocates no payoff to the third player, a...
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