We prove that every compactly generated non-transferable utility (NTU) game can be generated by a coalition production economy. The set of Walrasian payoff vectors for our induced coalition production economy coincides with the inner core of the balanced cover of the original game. This...

We prove that if a non-transferable utility (NTU) game is cardinally balanced and if, at every individually rational and efficient payoff vector, every non-zero normal vector to the set of payoff vectors feasible for the grand coalition is strictly positive, then the inner core is nonempty. The...

We provide two coincidence theorems that are useful mathematical tools for proving the nonemptiness of the inner core. The inner core is a refinement of the core of non-transferable utility (NTU) games. Our first coincidence theorem is a synthesis of Brouwer's fixed point theorem and Debreu and...