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Strategic leaks in first-price auctions and tacit collusion : the case of spying and counter-spying

Fan, Cuihong; Chŏn, Pyŏng-hŏn; Wolfstetter, Elmar - 2021

We analyze strategic leaks due to spying out a rival’s bid in a first-price auction. Such leaks induce sequential bidding, complicated by the fact that the spy may be a counterspy who serves the interests of the spied at bidder and reports strategically distorted information. This ambiguity...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012507333

Collusion and the Choice of Auction : An Experimental Study

Hinloopen, Jeroen; Onderstal, Sander - 2010

We experimentally examine the collusive properties of two commonly used auctions: the English auction (EN) and the … first-price sealed-bid auction (FPSB). In theory, both tacit and overt collusion are always incentive compatible in EN while … auctions do not differ in subjects’ propensity to collude overtly and in the likelihood that subjects defect from a collusive …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014188545

Auctions and leaks : a theoretical and experimental investigation

Fischer, Sven Heiko; Güth, Werner; Kaplan, Todd R.; … - 2014 - This version: November 5, 2014

We study first- and second-price private value auctions with sequential bidding where second movers may discover the … usual revenue dominance of first-price over second-price auctions. With a high probability of a leak, second-price auctions …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010433909

Auctions and leaks : a theoretical and experimental investigation

Fischer, Sven; Güth, Werner; Kaplan, Todd R.; Zultan, Ro'i - 2017 - Revised Version of JERP 2014-027

In first- and second-price private value auctions with sequential bidding, second movers may discover the first movers … eliminate the usual revenue dominance of first- over second-price auctions. With a high leak probability, second-price auctions …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011738563

Auction mechanisms and bidder collusion : bribes, signals and selection

Llorente-Saguer, Aniol; Zultan, Ro'i - 2014 - This version: November 20, 2014

The theoretical literature on collusion in auctions suggests that the first-price mechanism can deter the formation of … collusion in first-price and second-price auctions. Furthermore, failed collusion attempts distort the bidding behavior in the … neglects the effects of failed collusion attempts. In such contingencies, information revealed in the negotiation process is …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010472820

Pavlov, Gregory - 2013

We study cheap-talk pre-play communication in the static all-pay auctions. For the case of two bidders, all correlated …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009745257

Financial contracts as coordination device

Le Coq, Chloé; Schwenen, Sebastian - 2019

We study the use of financial contracts as bid-coordinating device in multi-unit uniform price auctions. Coordination …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012132321

Auction Mechanisms and Bidder Collusion : Bribes, Signals and Selection

Llorente-Saguer, Aniol; Zultan, Ro'i - 2015

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014139280

Endogenous cartel formation : experimental evidence

Fonseca, Miguel A.; Normann, Hans-Theo - 2014

In a Bertrand-oligopoly experiment, firms choose whether or not to engage in cartel-like communication and, if so, they may get fined by a cartel authority. We find that four-firm industries form cartels more often than duopolies because they gain less from a hysteresis effect after cartel...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010401724

Hybrid collusion : algorithmic pricing in human-computer laboratory markets

Normann, Hans-Theo; Sternberg, Martin - 2021

degree of (tacit) collusion when exclusively humans interact to the case of one firm in the market delegating its decisions …)certainty about the actual presence of an algorithm does not significantly affect collusion. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012509134