Similar Search Results

Delegation and Team Selection in Organizations : An Experimental Study

Hamman, John - 2018

We model a managerial decision environment in which a manager both determines the skill heterogeneity of her workers and determines whether to retain or delegate the ability to allocate tasks. The manager prefers delegating when uncertainty is sufficiently high relative to the incentive conflict...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012924939

Firm Organization and Market Structure : Centralization vs. Decentralization

Meagher, Kieron - 2009

The profitability of a firm is jointly determined by it's organizational structure and the market structure. To explore … the effects of market factors on optimal organizational structure we develop a real-time information processing model of a … general there is no unique optimal organization structure over time - when product market competition is intense …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012719892

Countervailing conflicts of interest in delegation games

Chiba, Saori; Leong, Kaiwen - In: Games 14 (2023) 6, pp. 1-20

In this paper, we investigate optimal delegation mechanisms in the presence of countervailing conflicts of interest in the context of principal-agent problems. We introduce two dimensions of conflict of interest-pandering incentives related to the outside option and project biases. We compare...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014443303

Rent seeking and organizational structure

Wärneryd, Karl - 2014

A hierarchically structured rent-seeking contest may be associated with lower equilibrium expenditure than a corresponding flat contest. In this chapter we discuss how this fact may be used to explain the structure of organizations such as firms, including why firms commonly have outside owners.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010359931

Hierarchical experimentation

Chen, Chia-hui; Ishida, Junichiro - 2015

We consider a bandit problem faced by a team of two heterogeneous players. The team is hierarchical in that one (the principal) retains the exclusive right to terminate the project while the other (the agent) focuses strictly on implementing the project assigned to him. As a key departure, we...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011343543

Subjective expected utility in games

Di Tillio, Alfredo - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 3 (2008) 3, pp. 287-323

axiomatic structure. An explicit characterization is given for Savage's axioms, and it is shown that a hierarchy of relatively …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011700273

Communication games with optional verification

Schopohl, Simon - 2017

We analyze a game in which players with unique information are arranged in a hierarchy. In the lowest layer each player … Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibria and analyse the time it takes each hierarchy to centralize the information. This allows us to …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011619165

Hierarchical Experimentation

Chen, Chia-hui - 2015

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013014110

Hierarchical Thinking and Learning in Rank Order Contests

Cãrare, Octavian; Haruvy, Ernan; Prasad, Ashutosh - 2012

We analyze a class of coordination games in which the Kth player to submit an entry wins a contest. These games have an infinite number of symmetric equilibria and the set of equilibria does not change with K. We run experiments with 15 participants and with K=3, 7, and 11. Our experiments show...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014173267

Mergers, investment decisions and internal organisation

Banal-Estañol, Albert; Macho-Stadler, Inés; … - 2003

We analyse the effects of investment decisions and firms' internal organisation on the efficiency and stability of horizontal mergers. In our framework economies of scale are endogenous and there might be internal conflict within merged firms. We show that often stable mergers do not lead to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001771977