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A budget-constrained buyer wants to purchase items from a shortlisted set. Items are differentiated by quality and sellers have private reserve prices for their items. Sellers quote prices strategically, inducing a knapsack game. The buyer's problem is to select a subset of maximal quality. We...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003848830
always true, and many well-known mechanisms are simple, including ascending auctions, posted prices, and serial dictatorship …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012584083
It is well-known that the ability of the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism to implement efficient outcomes for private value choice problems does not extend to interdependent value problems. When an agent's type affects other agents' utilities, it may not be incentive compatible for him to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011673132
As a selling mechanism, auctions have acquired a central position in the free market economy all over the globe. This … development has deepened, broadened, and expanded the theory of auctions in new directions. This chapter is intended as a …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014025452
We compare auctioning and grandfathering as allocation mechanisms of emission permits when there is a secondary market with market power and the firms have private information. Based on real-life cases such as the EU ETS, we consider a multi-unit, multi-bid uniform auction, modelled as a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010226080
The theoretical literature on collusion in auctions suggests that the first-price mechanism can deter the formation of … likely to affect the bidding behavior in first-price (but not second-price) auctions. We test experimentally a setup in which … collusion in first-price and second-price auctions. Furthermore, failed collusion attempts distort the bidding behavior in the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010472820
We investigate the relevance of conditional reasoning and belief formation for the occurrence of the winner's curse with the help of two experimental manipulations. First, we compare results from a very simple common-value auction game with results from a transformed version of this game that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011491773
in strategic settings. This article studies the role of anchoring bias in private-value auctions. We test experimentally … biased beliefs. In Dutch auctions, the effect of a starting price, is negative. We demonstrate that the long …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012138992
This paper discusses a capacity-based redispatch mechanism in which awarded market participants are compensated for their availability for redispatch, rather than activation. The rationale is to develop a market design that prevents so-called “inc-dec gaming” when including flexible...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014546505
The received characterizations of feasible interim allocations are mostly in the spirit of Border (1991): Fix a family of sets, each containing some player-types, and test the interim allocation under consideration against all these sets. In the published literature, such Border-like...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015410993