We conduct an experimental analysis of a best-of-three Tullock contest. Intermediate prizes lead to higher efforts, while increasing the role of luck (as opposed to effort) leads to lower efforts. Both intermediate prizes and luck reduce the probability of contest ending in two rounds. The...

Many contests feature a best-of-N structure. We focus on best-of-three contests between equally-skilled players. Using a general symmetric contest success function, we determine the relationship between the players' efforts in the various rounds. These results imply that the contests are more...

We analyze two-player contests in which each player exerts effort to influence his probability of winning the prize. Using minimal assumptions on the contest success function, we determine the dependence of equilibrium efforts, success probabilities, and expected payoffs on players' values for...

We analyze winner-pay contests in which players select bids, the winner is determined probabilistically through a contest success function, and only the winner must pay her bid. We show that a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium exists and is unique under weak assumptions on the contest success...

We conduct an experimental analysis of a best-of-three contest. Intermediate prizes lead to higher efforts, while increasing the role of luck (as opposed to effort) leads to lower efforts. Both intermediate prizes and luck reduce the probability of contest ending in two rounds. The patterns of...