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Self-correcting mechanisms in public procurement : why award and contract should be separated
Bös, Dieter; Kolmar, Martin - 2000
In public procurement a temporal separation of award and actual contracting can frequently be observed. In this paper … we give an explanation for this institutional setting. For incomplete procurement contracts we show that such a … post-award, pre-contract rent-seeking activities also increase efficiency. This is always the case if the procurement …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011539673
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Political Contestability and Contract Rigidity : An Analysis of Procurement Contracts
Beuve, Jean - 2016
We compare procurement contracts where the procurer is either a public agent or a private corporation. Using …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013006106
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Self-correcting mechanisms in public procurement : why award and contract should be seperated
Bös, Dieter; Kolmar, Martin - 2000
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001510204
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Self-Correcting Mechanisms in Public Procurement : Why Award and Contract Should Be Separated
Bös, Dieter; Kolmar, Martin - 2021
In public procurement a temporal separation of award and actual contracting can frequently be observed. In this paper … we give an explanation for this institutional setting. For incomplete procurement contracts we show that such a … post-award, pre-contract rent-seeking activities also increase efficiency. This is always the case if the procurement …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013321100
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A dynamic theory of regulatory capture
De Chiara, Alessandro; Schwarz, Marco - 2020
ineffective standard anti-corruption practices, such as whistle-blowing protection policies. We highlight that closing the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012220065
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A dynamic theory of regulatory capture
De Chiara, Alessandro; Schwarz, Marco - 2021
Firms often try to influence individuals that, like regulators, are tasked with advising or deciding on behalf of a third party. In a dynamic regulatory setting, we show that a firm may prefer to capture regulators through the promise of a lucrative future job opportunity (i.e., the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012491609
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Vertical undbundling, the coordination of investment, and network pricing
Brunekreeft, Gert; Friedrichsen, Nele - 2010
This paper provides a formal analysis on the investment coordination problem in a vertically separated electricity supply industry, although the analysis may apply also to other network industries. In an electric- ity system, the investment decisions of network and power plants need to be...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010421957
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Corporate Design for Regulability : A Principal-Agent-Supervisor Model
Engel, Christoph - 2005
Corporate actors differ from individuals in one important respect: technically, it may be possible to observe the formation of the corporate will from outside, and to impact on its formation. This feature can be exploited by regulators. One technology is inducing corporate actors to hire an...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014062548
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White collar crime : unearthing collusion in the procurement of infrastructure projects
Signor, Regis; Love, Peter; Ika, Lavagnon A. - In: IEEE transactions on engineering management : EM 69 (2022) 5, pp. 1932-1943
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013431063
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The role of suggestions and tips in distorting a third party's decision
Parra, Daniel - In: Games 11 (2020) 2/23, pp. 1-21
This paper experimentally investigates the impact of suggestive messages and tipping on a third party's judgment. The experimental design uses a model with three players, wherein two players (A and B) create a joint project, and the third player (C) decides how to divide the project's earnings...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012431902