We explore how subjects with heterogeneous beliefs respond to a surprise restart in a linear public goods game played for 20 rounds using either a "partners" or a "strangers" protocol. There are two restarts: one prior to Round 11 and another prior to Round 16. We elicit subject beliefs at the...

chapter 1 Introduction Appendix: a very brief and very simple introduction to game -- chapter 2 Part 2: The ultimatum game -- chapter 3 Part 3: Trust and trustworthiness in everyday life -- chapter 4 Part 4: Cooperation in social dilemmas -- chapter 5 I will if you will: resolving coordination...

We compile an IO toolkit for aggregative games and use inclusive best reply functions to deliver oligopoly comparative statics and ranking of firms' actions and profits. Aggregative games apply to additively separable direct and indirect preferences, as well as generalized quadratic forms....

We develop a model of strategic contractual incompleteness that identifies conditions under which principals might omit even costlessly verifiable terms. We then use experiments to test comparative statics predictions of the model. While it is well known that verifiability imperfections can...