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Timing of predictions in dynamic cheap talk : experts vs. quacks

Smirnov, Aleksei; Starkov, Egor - 2019

of privately known competence, who cares about his reputation, chooses the timing of the forecast regarding the outcome …. Further, any report hurts the forecaster’s reputation in the short run, with later reports incurring larger penalties. The … reputation of a silent forecaster, on the other hand, gradually improves over time. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012123351

Rewarding mediocrity? : optimal regulation of R&D markets with reputation concerns

Chen, Chia-hui; Ishida, Junichiro - 2017

counterpart where such a scheme can never be optimal. Our model also exhibits reputation dynamics which capture a pervasive view …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011623886

Asymmetric power and market failure : power hazard in exchange

Ertürk, Korkut A. - 2016

In simple textbook treatment of bilateral exchange traders end up on the contract curve such that the trading surplus is maximized regardless of any asymmetric bargaining power they might have. However, that need not be true when the terms of exchange are determined by uncooperative bargaining,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011435708

Career prospects and effort incentives : evidence from professional soccer

Miklós-Thal, Jeanine; Ullrich, Hannes - 2014

It is difficult to test the prediction that future career prospects create implicit effort incentives because researchers cannot randomly “assign” career prospects to economic agents. To overcome this challenge, we use data from professional soccer, where employees of the same club face...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010442390

Career prospects and effort incentives : evidence from professional soccer

Miklós-Thal, Jeanine; Ullrich, Hannes - In: Management science : journal of the Institute for … 62 (2016) 6, pp. 1645-1667

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011502533

Career prospects and effort incentives : evidence from professional soccer

Miklós-Thal, Jeanine; Ullrich, Hannes - 2014

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011808006

Observability of partners' past play and cooperation : experimental evidence

Kamei, Kenju; Kobayashi, Hajime; Tse, Tiffany Tsz Kwan - 2021

The observability of partners' past play is known to theoretically improve cooperation in an infinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma game under random matching. This paper presents evidence from an incentivized experiment that reputational information per se may not improve cooperation. A...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012665559

Splitting a Pie : Mixed Strategies in Bargaining Under Complete Information

Connell, Christopher - 2019

We characterize the mixed-strategy equilibria for the bargaining game in which two players simultaneously bid for a share of a pie and receive shares proportional to their bids, or zero if the bids sum to more than 100%. Of particular interest is the symmetric equilibrium in which each player's...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012858781

House Allocation with Existing Tenants : A Characterization

Sonmez, Tayfun - 2008

We analyze mechanisms that are used to allocate dormitory rooms to students at college campuses. Students consist of newcoming freshmen, who do not currently occupy any rooms, and more senior students each of whom occupies a room from the previous year. In addition to the rooms already occupied...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012727189

Efficiency Effects on Coalition Formation in Contests

Nevrekar, Saish - 2022

This paper studies the problem of endogenous coalition formation in contests: how players organize themselves in groups when faced with the common objective of securing a prize by exerting costly effort. The model presented adopts an axiomatic approach by assuming certain properties for the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013294669