In this paper I investigate the nature of the beliefs which agents must hold (at least implicitly) in order to justify their considering various alternatives, in two distinct settings: the Walrasian model without production (with competitive equilibrium), and the sell-all version of the...

We investigate how price ceilings and floors affect outcomes in continuous time, double auction markets with discrete goods and multiple qualities. When price controls exist, the existence of competitive equilibria (the solution concept of classical market theory) is no longer guaranteed; hence, we...

We show that debt is sustainable at a competitive equilibrium based solely on the reputation for repayment; that is, even without collateral or legal sanctions available to creditors. In an incomplete asset market, when the rate of interest falls recurrently below the rate of growth of the...

The paper presents and studies a new concept of coalition domination for incomplete markets. It was elaborated applying a contractual approach and based on the notion of fuzzy contractual allocation, see Marakulin (2011, 2013). Core allocations are implemented by the net trades (webs of...

Perfectly competitive economies are economic models with many agents, each of whom is relatively insignificant. This chapter studies the relations between the basic economic concept of competitive (or Walrasian ) equilibrium , and the game-theoretic solution concept of value . It includes the...

This paper studies an exchange economy with a finite number of agents in which each agent is initially endowed with a finite number of (personalized) indivisible commodities. We observe that the core equivalence theorem may not hold for this economy when the coalitional form game is generated in...