Showing 1 - 10 of 715
We use experiments to analyze what type of communication is most effective in achieving cooperation in a simple collusion game. Consistent with the existing literature on communication and collusion, even minimal communication leads to a short run increase in collusion. However, in a limited...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014201287
Allowing firms to cooperate in their R&D is an industrial policy which has received much attention in recent economics literature. Many of these contributions are based on the seminal analysis of d?Aspremont and Jacquemin [1988]. We provide a general version of their model which encompasses...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014213109
We analyze spying out a rival’s price in a Bertrand market game with incomplete information. Spying transforms a simultaneous into a robust sequential moves game. We provide conditions for profitable espionage. The spied at firm may attempt to immunize against spying by delaying its pricing...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012892109
Effectively fighting cartels requires that cartels be discovered. Economic theory gives some behavioural patterns that are indicative of collusion and allow the distinction between collusion from competition. This paper focuses on the volatility of market shares as indicator for collusive...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013139174
We analyze spying out a rival's price in a Bertrand market game with incomplete information. Spying transforms a simultaneous into a robust sequential moves game. We provide conditions for profitable espionage. The spied at firm may attempt to immunize against spying by delaying its pricing...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012893812
This paper introduces a number of game-theoretic tools to model collusive agreements among firms in vertically differentiated markets. I firstly review some classical literature on collusion between two firms producing goods of exogenous different qualities. I then extend the analysis to a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011660599
This note considers cartel stability when the cartelized products are vertically differentiated. If market shares are maintained at pre-collusive levels, then the firm with the lowest competitive price-cost margin has the strongest incentive to deviate from the collusive agreement. The...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012837017
We analyze strategic leaks due to spying out a rival’s bid in a first-price auction. Such leaks induce sequential bidding, complicated by the fact that the spy may be a counterspy who serves the interests of the spied at bidder and reports strategically distorted information. This ambiguity...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012507333
We analyze spying out a rival's price in a Bertrand market game with incomplete information. Spying transforms a simultaneous into a robust sequential moves game. We provide conditions for profitable espionage. The spied at firm may attempt to immunize against spying by delaying its pricing...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011962353
We prove that a sufficient condition for the core existence in a n-firm vertically differentiated market is that the qualities of firms' products are equally-spaced along the quality spectrum. This result contributes to see that a fully collusive agreement among firms in such markets is more...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012837016