Chapter 1. Introduction -- Chapter 2. Rationality of choices made by individual consumer -- Chapter 3. Rationality of choices made by groups of consumers -- Chapter 4. Rationality of choices made by individual producers -- Chapter 5. Rationality of choices made by groups of producers by...

We analyze the strategic behavior of firms when demand is determined by a rule of thumb behavior of consumers. We assume consumer dynamics where individual consumers follow simple behavioral decision rules governed by imitation and habit as suggested in consumer research. On this basis, we...

This paper describes a classroom game used to teach students about the impact of reputations in markets with asymmetric information. The game is an extension of Holt and Sherman's lemons market game and simulates a market under three information conditions. In the full information setting, all...

This paper investigates the existence of unique equilibrium in two-good economies where agents have preferences with the same relative risk aversion and different utility weights. Aggregate demand behavior is characterized in terms of both macrolevel and micro-level information inherent in the...

This paper addresses firstly why people have to use fiat money and then why they are rationally willing to accept it from the perspective of general equilibrium by using dynamic game to determine agents' expectation of its purchasing power in unrevealed future. Its model formulates the process...

In an infinite-time decentralized sequence economy, agents use fiat money to bridge markets as if they make trades in a centralized economy, to avoid huge transaction cost that all agents' going together must incur. The model in this paper formulates the process how agents decide the fiat...

The paper presents and studies a new concept of coalition domination for incomplete markets. It was elaborated applying a contractual approach and based on the notion of fuzzy contractual allocation, see Marakulin (2011, 2013). Core allocations are implemented by the net trades (webs of...

We show that all the fundamental properties of competitive equilibrium in Marshall's theory of value, as presented in Note XXI of the mathematical appendix to his Principles of Economics (1890), derive from the Strong Law of Demand. This is, existence, uniqueness, optimality, global stability of...

We study the design of mechanisms that implement Lindahl or Walrasian allocations and whose Nash equilibria are dynamically stable for a wide class of adaptive dynamics. We argue that supermodularity is not a desirable stability criterion in this mechanism design context, focusing instead on...