Examples of repeated destructive behavior abound throughout the history of human societies. This paper examines the role of social memory -- a society's vicarious beliefs about the past -- in creating and perpetuating destructive conflicts. We examine whether such behavior is consistent with the...

This paper suggests a theory of choice among strategic situations when the rules of play are not properly specified. We take the view that a quot;strategic situationquot; is adequately described by a TU game since it specifies what is feasible for each coalition but is silent on the procedures...

This article suggests that the methodological strength of what is known as the neoclassic utility theory (NCUT) comes from the relationship between the parlor games, typical of formal logic, and the seek and find games which are founded in the modal logic. Through the use of the semantic games...

This paper suggests a theory of choice among strategic situations when the rules of play are not properly specified. We take the view that a "strategic situation" is adequately described by a TU game since it specifies what is feasible for each coalition but is silent on the procedures that are...

This paper creates a game theoretic model to determine how pendulum arbitration or baseball arbitration impacts the incentives of litigants. Pendulum arbitration is when both parties submit competing proposals and the arbitrator chooses only one of the bids, in its entirety, to be binding on...

We review the theory of fairness as it pertains to concretely specified problems of resource allocations. We present punctual notions designed to evaluate how well individuals, or groups, are treated in relation to one another: no-envy, egalitarian-equivalence, individual and collective lower or...

This paper analyzes reputational bargaining between two parties who can strategically send an ultimatum to resolve the conflict by law. Each party is either a justified player who is inflexible about demand and resolves the conflict by law whenever possible, or an unjustified player who is...

In this paper, we analyze sequential bankruptcy problems, which generalize bankruptcy problems. They contain the problems of sharing water in a trans-boundary river and of allocating expedition rewards in projects. We provide three mechanisms for generalizing rules for bankruptcy problems to...

This paper is the first systematic examination of (counter)terrorism dynamic games with two types of externalities: temporal and spatial. We consider two types of non-cooperative behavior; one in which national authorities are sensitive with respect to the spatial spillovers of counterterror...

We study strategic interaction between agents who distill the complex world around them into simpler situations. Assuming agents share the same cognitive frame, we show how the frame affects equilibrium outcomes. In one-shot and repeated interactions, the frame causes agents to be either better...