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Incentive-compatibility in large games

Nehring, Klaus - In: Mathematical social sciences 35 (1998) 1, pp. 57-67

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001245334

Common priors under incomplete information : a unification

Nehring, Klaus - In: Economic theory : official journal of the Society for … 18 (2001) 3, pp. 535-553

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001614941

Assessing the truth axiom under incomplete information

Bonanno, Giacomo; Nehring, Klaus - In: Mathematical social sciences 36 (1998) 1, pp. 3-29

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001398213

On Stalnaker's notion of strong rationalizability and Nash equilibrium in perfect information games

Bonanno, Giacomo; Nehring, Klaus - In: Theory and decision : an international journal for … 45 (1998) 3, pp. 291-295

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001354457

On the logic and role of Negative Introspection of Common Belief

Bonanno, Giacomo - In: Mathematical social sciences 35 (1998) 1, pp. 17-36

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001245336

How to make sense of the common prior assumption under incomplete information

Bonanno, Giacomo; Nehring, Klaus - In: International journal of game theory : official journal … 28 (1999) 3, pp. 409-434

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001419666

Assessing the truth axiom under incomplete information

Bonanno, Giacomo; Nehring, Klaus - 1997

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000968270

Trust and reciprocity in the investment game with indirect reward

Güth, Werner; Königstein, Manfred; Marchand, Nadège; … - In: Homo oeconomicus 18 (2001) 2, pp. 241-262

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001748691

Efficient and strategy-proof voting rules : a characterization

Nehring, Klaus; Puppe, Clemens - In: Games and economic behavior 59 (2007) 1, pp. 132-153

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003452139

Trust and reciprocity in the investment game with indirect reward

Güth, Werner; Königstein, Manfred; Marchand, Nadège; … - 2000

Experimental studies have shown that trust and reciprocity are effective in increasing efficiency when complete contracting is infeasible. One example is the study by Berg et al. (1995) of the investment game. In this game the person who receives the investment is the one who may reward the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009612013