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He who must not be named
Février, Philippe - In: Review of economic design : RED 8 (2003) 1, pp. 99-119
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001785116
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Coordination in sender-receiver games with no common language
Février, Philippe; Kramarz, Francis - 2000
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001470568
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Equilibrium selection: Payoff or risk dominance? The case of the "weakest link"
Février, Philippe; Linnemer, Laurent - In: Journal of economic behavior & organization : JEBO 60 (2006) 2, pp. 164-181
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003314611
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Heterogeneous preferences for altruism : gender and personality, social status, giving and taking
Visser, Michael S.; Roelofs, Matthew R. - In: Experimental economics : a journal of the Economic … 14 (2011) 4, pp. 490-506
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009488506
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Selection in tournaments : the case of chess players
Linnemer, Laurent; Visser, Michael S. - 2014
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010465158
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Selection in tournaments : the case of chess players
Linnemer, Laurent; Visser, Michael S. - 2015
We consider a simple tournament model in which individuals auto-select into the contest on the basis of their commonly known strength levels, and privately observed strength-shocks (reflecting temporary deviations from observed levels). The model predicts that the participation rate should...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010472714
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Selection in Tournaments : The Case of Chess Players
Linnemer, Laurent - 2015
We consider a simple tournament model in which individuals auto-select into the contest on the basis of their commonly known strength levels, and privately observed strength-shocks (reflecting temporary deviations from observed levels). The model predicts that the participation rate should...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013029494