We study a public goods game where subjects get feedback either continually or intermittently. We find that the intermittent feedback helps to mitigate problems of free riding because subjects in this treatment focus more on a string of choices rather than deciding on a case by case basis as in...

Increasing the share of women in politics is regularly promoted as a means of reducing corruption. In this paper, we look for evidence of a gender gap in dishonesty among elected representatives, as well as how this changes with time in office. Based on a sample of 356 inexperienced and...

Who gets elected to political office? The negative selection hypothesis posits that the inherently dishonest run for office, expecting to earn political rent. Alternatively, the positive selection hypothesis suggests that individuals join politics to make a difference. Developing country...

We explore how subjects with heterogeneous beliefs respond to a surprise restart in a linear public goods game played for 20 rounds using either a "partners" or a "strangers" protocol. There are two restarts: one prior to Round 11 and another prior to Round 16. We elicit subject beliefs at the...

chapter 1 Introduction Appendix: a very brief and very simple introduction to game -- chapter 2 Part 2: The ultimatum game -- chapter 3 Part 3: Trust and trustworthiness in everyday life -- chapter 4 Part 4: Cooperation in social dilemmas -- chapter 5 I will if you will: resolving coordination...