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Under capital tax competition, surprisingly, Ogawa and Wildasin (2009, American Economic Review, 99(4), 1206-1217) find that uncoordinated policymaking leads to a first-best outcome even in the presence of transboundary pollution.However, I show that if the level of environmental regulation is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012935070
Public good provision is often local and also affects bystanders. Is provision harder if contributions harm bystanders, and is provision easier if outsiders gain a windfall profit? In an experiment we observe that both positive and negative externalities reduce provision levels whenever actors...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014204524
Cartels are inherently instable. Each cartelist is best off if it breaks the cartel, while the remaining firms remain loyal. If firms interact only once, if products are homogenous, if firms compete in price, and if marginal cost is constant, theory even predicts that strategic interaction...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014205721
When providing public goods through voluntary contributions, a donor may introduce unilateral matching in order to reduce underprovision of the public good and thus inefficiency. By itself, however, matching benefits the donor but harms the recipient. We apply Cornes and Hartley's aggregative...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013051271
When providing public goods through voluntary contributions, a donor may introduce unilateral matching in order to reduce underprovision of the public good and thus inefficiency. By itself, however, matching benefits the donor but harms the recipient. We apply Cornes and Hartley's aggregative...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010371914
Cartels are inherently instable. Each cartelist is best off if it breaks the cartel, while the remaining firms remain loyal. If firms interact only once, if products are homogenous, if firms compete in price, and if marginal cost is constant, theory even predicts that strategic interaction...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003877116
Providing public goods is hard, because providers are best off free-riding. Is it even harder if one group's public good is a public bad for another group or, conversely, gives the latter a windfall profit? We experimentally study public goods provision embedded in a social context and find that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003877140
We study the effect of voting when insiders' public goods provision may affect passive outsiders. Without voting insiders' contributions do not differ, regardless of whether outsiders are positively or negatively affected or even unaffected. Voting on the recommended contribution level enhances...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013044538
This paper models inter-jurisdiction competition for foreign direct investment and optimal government policy intervention to protect the national interest. The inter-jurisdiction competition for a multinational has the potential of favouring the multinational and of becoming detrimental for the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012768387
frequently used as a subsidy policy in the real world. Our results show that there is not necessarily an optimal cost …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014118730