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Distribution-Dependent Value of Money : A Coalition-Proof Approach to Monetary Equilibrium

Kim, Byoung-Ki; Kwon, Ohik; Lee, Suk Won - 2021

We present a simple, finite-state search model to understand how the cross-sectional distribution of money affects its … value. We first document a network effect: the value of a given unit of money is higher when its distribution is even …. This approach is designed to be especially pertinent in the context of private issuance of money, in particular …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013211196

Mechanism design with aftermarkets : on the impossibility of pure information intermediation

Dworczak, Piotr - 2016

A mediator, with no prior information and no control over the market protocol, attempts to redesign the information structure in the market by running an information intermediation mechanism with transfers that first elicits information from an agent, and then discloses information to another...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011865067

Bilateral trade with a benevolent intermediary

Eilat, Ran; Pauzner, Ady - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 16 (2021) 4, pp. 1655-1714

We study intermediaries who seek to maximize gains from trade in bilateral negotiations. Intermediaries are players: they cannot commit to act against their objective function and deny, in some cases, trade they believe to be beneficial. This impairs their ability to assist the parties relative...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012806593

Dynamic contracting : an irrelevance theorem

Eső, Péter; Szentes, Balàzs - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 12 (2017) 1, pp. 109-139

This paper generalizes a conceptual insight in dynamic contracting with quasilin- ear payoffs: the principal does not need to pay any information rents for extract- ing the agent’s “new” private information obtained after signing the contract. This is shown in a general model in which the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011704662

Limited higher order beliefs and the welfare effects of public information

Cornand, Camille; Heinemann, Frank - 2013

In games with strategic complementarities, public information about the state of the world has a larger impact on equilibrium actions than private information of the same precision, because the former is more informative about the likely behavior of others. This may lead to welfare-reducing...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009787097

Central bank reputation, cheap talk and transparency as substitutes for commitment : experimental evidence

Duffy, John; Heinemann, Frank - 2016 - This Draft: 2 December 2016

We implement a repeated version of the Barro-Gordon monetary policy game in the laboratory and ask whether reputation serves as a substitute for commitment, enabling the central bank to achieve the efficient Ramsey equilibrium and avoid the inefficient, time-inconsistent one-shot Nash...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011572114

Optimal transport of information

Malamud, Semyon; Cieślak, Anna; Schrimpf, Andreas - 2021 - This version: March 3, 2021

We study the general problem of Bayesian persuasion (optimal information design) with continuous actions and continuous state space in arbitrary dimensions. First, we show that with a finite signal space, the optimal information design is always given by a partition. Second, we take the limit of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012487719

Policy announcement design

Cieślak, Anna; Malamud, Semyon; Schrimpf, Andreas - 2020 - This version: December 15, 2019

We study the general problem of information design for a policymaker—a central bank—that communicates its private information (the ``state") to the public. We show that it is optimal for the policymaker to partition the state space into a finite number of ``clusters” and to communicate to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012181571

One Truth and a Thousand Lies : Focal Points in Mechanism Design

Bochet, Olivier - 2017

Truthtelling is often viewed as focal in direct mechanisms. We introduce two new notions of robust implementation based on the premise that society may be composed of "primitive'' agents who, whenever confronted with a strategy profile, anchor to truthtelling and make a limited number of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012951989

Full Implementation in Sequential Information Design

Sato, Hiroto - 2021

This paper studies the full implementation in sequential information design (Doval and Ely (2020)) in which the designer can construct the extensive form as well as the information struc- ture. In this framework, I characterize the optimal outcome under full implementation when players and the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013323125