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Osano, Hiroshi; Kobayashi, Mami - 2003

We examine renegotiation in a double moral hazard model with an ex ante budget balancing constraint when both the … principal and the agent are allowed to make a renegotiation offer even though the principal proposes an initial contract. Under …-best allocation of the standard double moral hazard model without renegotiation. The result of this paper gives some reasons for the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014074819

Contract design with limited commitment

Gretschko, Vitali; Wambach, Achim - 2018

characterization of renegotiation-proof states of such a renegotiation. The proposed solution concept provides an effective and easy …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011946012

Optimal Taxation in a Common Resource Oligopoly Game

Bisceglia, Michele - 2018

In this paper, we investigate the optimal taxation policy in a differential oligopoly game where the competing firms share the access to a productive renewable resource. We show that, in a linear Feedback Nash Equilibrium of the game, a linear Markov tax, imposed on the output, and specified as...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012930240

A Theory and Experiment of How Competitive Bargaining Can Lead to Efficient Coordination

Baranski, Andrzej - 2017

Synergies in production are ubiquitous in shared production processes such as those involving individuals within a team, departments within a firm, or industries within a country. Using a weakest link game with ex post bargaining to redistribute the joint surplus, we study a situation in which...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012955103

Rewards and punishments : informal contracting through social preferences

Chassang, Sylvain; Zehnder, Christian - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 11 (2016) 3, pp. 1145-1179

This paper develops a positive model of informal contracting in which rewards and punishments are not determined by an ex ante optimal plan but instead express the ex post moral sentiments of the arbitrating party. We consider a subjective performance evaluation problem in which a principal can...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011671838

Interactions across multiple games : cooperation, corruption, and organizational design

Bendor, Jonathan; Bolte, Lukas; Immorlica, Nicole; … - 2022

Teams face a variety of strategic circumstances, and it is socially beneficial for teams to cooperate in productive but not in corrupt ones. Understanding the behavior and social impact of teams requires understanding how cooperation in one situation depends on expectations of cooperation in...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013294982

Merger Failures

Banal-Estañol, Albert; Seldeslachts, Jo - 2005

This paper proposes an explanation as to why some mergers fail, based on the interaction between the pre-merger gathering of information and the postmerger integration processes. Rational managers acting in the interest of shareholders may still lead their firms into unsuccessfully integrated...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014064976

Heterogeneous Social Preferences, Screening, and Employment Contracts

von Siemens, Ferdinand - 2011

This paper studies a monopsonistic firm's optimal employment contracts if workers have private information on both their propensity for social comparisons and their ability. Employees of the firm are taken to form their own distinct reference group. It is shown that screening workers with equal...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014195101

Endogenous Spillovers, Increased Competition and Re-Organization Waves

Rodriguez Palenzuela, Diego - 2012

We consider an entrepreneur that is the sole producer of a cost reducing skill, but the entrepreneur that hires a team to use the skill cannot prevent collusive trade for the innovation-related knowledge between employees and competitors. We show that there are two types of diffusion-avoiding...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014197952

It Hurts to Ask

Bénabou, Roland; Jaroszewicz, Ania; Loewenstein, George - 2022

We analyze the offering, asking, and granting of help or other benefits as a three-stage game with bilateral private information between a person in need of help and a potential help-giver. Asking entails the risk of rejection, which can be painful: since unawareness of the need can no longer be...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014076462