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We study a credence goods problem - that is, a moral hazard problem with non-contractible outcome - where altruistic experts (the agents) care both about their income and the utility of consumers (the principals). Experts' preferences over income and their consumers' utility are convex, such...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012431181
We make three contributions to the theory of contracting under asymmetric information. First, we establish a competitive analog to the revelation principle which we call the implementation principle. This principle provides a complete characterization of all incentive compatible, indirect...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014033695
This paper characterizes the equilibrium sets of an intrinsic common agencygame with discrete types and direct revelation mechanisms. After presentinga general algorithm to find the pure-strategy equilibria of this game, we use itto characterize these equilibria when the two principals control...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011400396
This paper characterizes the equilibrium sets of an intrinsic common agency game with direct exter-nalities between principals both under complete and asymmetric information. Direct externalities arise when the contracting variable of one principal affects directly the other principal s payoff....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011400799
This paper characterizes the equilibrium sets of an intrinsic common agency game with discrete types and direct revelation mechanisms. After presenting a general algorithm to find the pure-strategy equilibria of this game, we use it to characterize these equilibria when the two principals...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013320779
We make three contributions to the theory of contracting under asymmetric information. First, we establish a competitive analog to the revelation principle which we call the implementation principle. This principle provides a complete characterization of all incentive compatible, indirect...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014033862
It is well-known that the ability of the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism to implement efficient outcomes for private value choice problems does not extend to interdependent value problems. When an agent's type affects other agents' utilities, it may not be incentive compatible for him to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011673132
The literature on both entry deterrence and the influence of special interest groups is extensive. In this paper we attempt to marry these strands of literature by developing a model of entry deterrence through interest group influence in an entry re-regulation context. In contrast to other...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011539115
As a part of their industry or competition policies governments decide whether to allow for free market entry of firms or to regulate market access. We analyze a model where governments (ab)use these policy decisions for strategic reasons in an international setting. Multiple equilibria of this...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011508060
I develop a model of strategic communication between an uninformed receiver and a partially informed sender who is averse to lying. The sender's cost of lying is endogenous, depending on the receiver's beliefs induced by the sender's message, rather than on its exogenous formulation. Such...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013062525