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End behavior of the threshold protocol game on complete and bipartite graphs
Fedrigo, Alexandra - In: Games 15 (2024) 6, pp. 1-16
graphs. Many generalizations are proposed and applied. This work explores the impact of graph topology on the outcome of the … threshold protocol game and consequently considers finite graphs. By exploiting the well-known topologies of complete and … complete bipartite graphs, the outcome of the threshold protocol game can be fully characterized on these graphs. These …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015271462
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Bertrand competition under network externalities
Aoyagi, Masaki - 2013
Two sellers engage in price competition to attract buyers located on a network. The value of the good of either seller to any buyer depends on the number of neighbors on the network who consume the same good. For a generic specification of consumption externalities, we show that an equilibrium...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009788069
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Coordination games on graphs
Apt, Krzysztof R.; Keijzer, Bart de; Rahn, Mona; … - In: International journal of game theory : official journal … 46 (2017) 3, pp. 851-877
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011947295
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Stable organizations with externalities
Currarini, Sergio - 2002
We study the stability properties of organizations in partition function games, describing cooperative situations with externalities. An organization is defined as a group of agents, together with a set of bilateral relations, formally, a connected graph. Because of the presence of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011597403
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A generalization of ARC-KAYLES
Dailly, Antoine; Gledel, Valentin; Heinrich, Marc - In: International journal of game theory : official journal … 48 (2019) 2, pp. 491-511
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012062054
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The center value : a sharing rule for cooperative games on acyclic graphs
Navarro, Florian - In: Mathematical social sciences 105 (2020), pp. 1-13
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012434098
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Sufficient conditions for stable equilibria
Wilson, Robert B.; Govindan, Srihari - In: Theoretical Economics 1 (2006) 2, pp. 167-206
A refinement of the set of Nash equilibria that satisfies two assumptions is shown to select a subset that is stable in the sense defined by Kohlberg and Mertens. One assumption requires that a selected set is invariant to adjoining redundant strategies and the other is a strong version of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599369
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Sufficient conditions for stable equilibria
Wilson, Robert B.; Govindan, Srihari - In: Theoretical Economics 1 (2006) 2, pp. 167-206
A refinement of the set of Nash equilibria that satisfies two assumptions is shown to select a subset that is stable in the sense defined by Kohlberg and Mertens. One assumption requires that a selected set is invariant to adjoining redundant strategies and the other is a strong version of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005515738
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Equilibrium Selection in Stochastic Games
Herings, P. Jean-Jacques; Peeters, Ronald J.A.P. - EconWPA - 2001
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005118581
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Chapter 41 Strategic equilibrium
Van Damme, Eric - In: Handbook of game theory with economic applications : …, (pp. 1521-1596). 2002
This chapter of the Handbook of Game Theory (Vol. 3) provides an overview of the theory of Nash equilibrium and its refinements. The starting-point is the rationalistic approach to games and the question whether there exists a convincing, self-enforcing theory of rational behavior in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014024504