This paper studies the falsiability of the hypothesis of Nash behavoir, for the case of a finite number of players who choose from continuous domains, subject to constraints. The results obtained here are negative. Assuming the observation of finite data sets, and using weak, but non-trivial,...

This paper studies the falsifiability of the hypothesis of Nash behavior, for the case of a finite number of players who choose from continuous domains, subject to constraints. The results obtained here are negative. Assuming the observation of finite data sets, and using weak, but nontrivial,...

An observer makes a number of observations of an industry producing a homogeneous good. Each observation consists of the market price, the output of individual firms and perhaps information on each firm's production cost. We provide various tests (typically, linear programs) with which the...

We provide a novel mechanism that delivers efficient provision of public goods in an economy that may display warm-glow preferences. No information about the fundamentals of the economy is required on the mechanism designer's side, so the mechanism is informationally decentralized. The mechanism...

We provide a simple(r) solution to the problem of efficiently providing public goods in a warm-glow economy. Compared with Allouch [2013], our solution is closer to Lindahl [1958], which requires only one personalized price for each consumer. This innovation is important in the sense that it...