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observe any news to mimic high types by quitting strategically. In equilibrium, there is a mimicking phase of time when low …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015195156
consumption externalities, we show that an equilibrium price equals the marginal cost if and only if the buyer network is complete … or cyclic. When the externalities are approximately linear in the size of consumption, we identify the classes of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009788069
In this paper we investigate when public enforcement of insider trading regulations reduces the amount of insider trading. We model a game between a potentially self-interested regulator enforcing insider trading laws and a trader who may be trading on inside information. We show that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010664058
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002346437
There is a general consensus that the root cause of the most recent turmoil in the domestic and global markets is due to a failure in our regulatory system. Yet, Congress has not supported comprehensive regulation related to the day-to-day activities of mortgage brokers and their relationship...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014199708
Citizens may engage in crime, depending on the probability of being searched and their types such as legal earning opportunities. Police observes information about citizens' types and allocates search efforts to catch citizens who commit crimes. I show that the police who has full information...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014076370
We study the role of whistleblowing in the following inspection game. Two agents who compete for a prize can either behave legally or illegally. After the competition, a controller investigates the agents' behavior. This inspection game has a unique (Bayesian) equilibrium in mixed strategies. We...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014077977
First we show that for wealth-constrained agents who may commit an act twice the optimal sanctions are the offender's entire wealth for the first and zero for the second crime. Then we ask the question whether this decreasing sanction scheme is subgame perfect (time consistent), i.e., does a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014104293
A simple decision theoretic model shows the doping incentives for a member of a professional sports team. Depending on the detection probability and the punishment, a sportsman dopes not at all, at a medium or at the maximal level. The whole team has a higher incentive than an individual team...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012947829
We study the role of whistleblowing in the following inspection game. Two agents who compete for a prize can either behave legally or illegally. After the competition, a controller investigates the agents’ behavior. This inspection game has a unique Bayesian equilibrium in mixed strategies. We...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011417290