conclude that it might be better to reduce the precision of public signals or entirely withhold information. This paper shows … that public information should always be provided with maximum precision, but under certain conditions not to all agents …

This paper considers an infinitely repeated three-player Bayesian game with lack of information on two sides, in which … generalization of Aumann, Maschler and Stearns (1995) two-player zero-sum one-sided incomplete information model. Under a correlated … prior, the informed player faces the problem of how to optimally disclose information among two uninformed players in order …

An entrepreneur contracts with a consultant, who is protected by limited liability, to supply information about the … probability than a bad one. The entrepreneur makes an upfront payment that the consultant can either invest in information … entrepreneurs so long as his referrals remain high. The principal under-utilizes information in settings (i) and (ii). In setting …

which agents receive private information over time. We propose a suitable generalization of the Vickrey …

An entrepreneur contracts with a consultant, who is protected by limited liability, to supply information about the … probability than a bad one. The entrepreneur makes an upfront payment that the consultant can either invest in information … entrepreneurs so long as his informal referrals remain high. The principal finds it optimal to under-utilize information if she uses …

In an evolutionary delegation game, we investigate the effects on market outputs of different levels of information … information -- by hiding the current composition of the industry -- then we show how managers' beliefs affect the long run …