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To fight or to give up? : dynamic contests with a deadline

Ryvkin, Dmitry - In: Management science : journal of the Institute for … 68 (2022) 11, pp. 8144-8165

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014279970

Corporate Leniency in a Dynamic World : The Preemptive Push of an Uncertain Future

Gärtner, Dennis - 2014

This paper investigates how leniency programs can induce collusive offenders to self report in a dynamic setting, where the risk of independent detection evolves stochastically over time. We show how this uncertainty about the future can push firms into preemptive application, and that these...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013062500

Timing of predictions in dynamic cheap talk : experts vs. quacks

Smirnov, Aleksei; Starkov, Egor - 2019

of privately known competence, who cares about his reputation, chooses the timing of the forecast regarding the outcome …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012123351

Noisy Signaling in Monopoly

Mirman, Leonard J. - 2013

We study the informational role of prices in a stochastic environment. We provide a closed-form solution of the monopoly problem when the price imperfectly signals quality to the uninformed buyers. We then study the effect of noise on output, market price, information flows, and expected...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013093809

Noisy Signaling in Monopoly

Salgueiro, Egas M. - 2013

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013071968

Optimal Market Making Under Partial Information and Numerical Methods for Impulse Control Games with Applications

Zabaljauregui, Diego - 2020

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012842492

Spatial Competition with Interacting Agents

Ottino-Loffler, Bertrand; Stonedahl, Forrest; Veetil, … - 2017

We generalize Hotelling’s model of spatial competition with more than two firms in a two-dimensional space. Firms choose both price and location to maximize profits. The principle of minimum differentiation does not hold in general. Local duopolies emerge from the interaction between firms....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014035546

Subgame-perfect equilibria in stochastic timing games

Riedel, Frank; Steg, Jan-Henrik - 2014

We introduce a notion of subgames for stochastic timing games and the related notion of subgame-perfect equilibrium in … general, we argue that our model is the appropriate version for timing games. We show that the notion coincides with the usual … one for discrete-time games. Many timing games in continuous time have only equilibria in mixed strategies - in particular …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010406213

Quick or persistent? : strategic investment demanding versatility

Steg, Jan-Henrik; Thijssen, Jacco J. J. - 2015

In this paper we analyse a dynamic model of investment under uncertainty in a duopoly, in which each firm has an option to switch from the present market to a new market. We construct a subgame perfect equilibrium in mixed strategies and show that both preemption and attrition can occur along...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011284232

On preemption in discrete and continuous time

Steg, Jan-Henrik - 2016

The seminal work of Fudenberg and Tirole (1985) on how preemption erodes the value of an option to wait raises general questions about the relation between models in discrete and continuous time and thus about the interpretation of its central result, relying on an "infinitely fine grid". Here...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011449161