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This paper reexamines the paradoxical aspect of the electronic mail game (Rubinstein, 1989). The electronic mail game is a coordination game with payoff uncertainty. At a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the game, players cannot achieve the desired coordination of actions even when a high order of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003321328
This paper reexamines the paradoxical aspect of the electronic mail game (Rubinstein, 1989). The electronic mail game is a coordination game with payoff uncertainty. At a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the game, players cannot achieve the desired coordination of actions even when a high order of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014059114
An entrepreneur contracts with a consultant, who is protected by limited liability, to supply information about the … probability than a bad one. The entrepreneur makes an upfront payment that the consultant can either invest in information … entrepreneurs so long as his referrals remain high. The principal under-utilizes information in settings (i) and (ii). In setting …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012117630
An entrepreneur contracts with a consultant, who is protected by limited liability, to supply information about the … probability than a bad one. The entrepreneur makes an upfront payment that the consultant can either invest in information … entrepreneurs so long as his informal referrals remain high. The principal finds it optimal to under-utilize information if she uses …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012932515
We use a laboratory experiment to study how mutual payoff information affects play in strategic settings. Subjects play … the Prisoner's Dilemma or Stag Hunt game against randomly re-matched opponents under two information treatments. In our … partial-information treatment subjects are shown only their own payoffs, while in our full-information treatment they are …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013213631
We study the problem of elicitation of subjective beliefs of an agent when the beliefs are ambiguous (the set of beliefs is a non-singleton set) and the agent's preference exhibits ambiguity aversion; in particular, as represented by alpha-maxmin preferences. We construct a direct revelation...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012969749
A simple decision theoretic model shows the doping incentives for a member of a professional sports team. Depending on the detection probability and the punishment, a sportsman dopes not at all, at a medium or at the maximal level. The whole team has a higher incentive than an individual team...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012947829
When two agents with private information use a mechanism to determine an outcome, what happens when they are free to … outcome in one mechanism while they play another mechanism and learn new information. A decision rule is posterior …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013037651
In an information cascade experiment participants are confronted with artificial predecessors predicting in line with … coinciding predictions of predecessors are observed, regardless of whether additional information is revealed by these …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010343945
In an information cascade experiment participants are confronted with artificial predecessors predicting in line with … coinciding predictions of predecessors are observed, regardless of whether additional information is revealed by these … is not recognized. -- information cascade ; Bayes' Rule ; decision under risk and uncertainty ; experimental economics …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003402312