The recent literature on firm-to-firm trade has documented salient empirical regularities of the buyer-seller network. We propose a simplistic re-interpretation of the classical Krugman (1980) model that accounts for surprisingly many of the empirical regularities. This re-interpretation relies...

As a part of their industry or competition policies governments decide whether to allow for free market entry of firms or to regulate market access. We analyze a model where governments (ab)use these policy decisions for strategic reasons in an international setting. Multiple equilibria of this...

This paper builds on an analytical tool for studying entrepreneurship in a new classical general equilibrium framework. The entrepreneurial economy model takes the consumer-producer economy model and makes explicit the role of the entrepreneur. This paper uses it to study entrepreneurial...

This paper examines the interaction between preferential trade agreements (PTAs) and multilateral tariff reduction in a model of imperfect competition. A growing literature finds that the formation of PTAs alters the incentives for and the sustainability of multilateral tariff reduction. We show...

In this paper we examine an alternative policy scenario, where governments allow polluting firms to trade permits in a strategic environmental policy model. We demonstrate, among other things, that with no market power in the permits market, governments of the exporting firms do not have an...

The amount of cooperation needed to improve the welfare of signatories of International Environmental Agreements (IEAs), in the presence of market imperfections, depends on the characteristics of pollution. In a dynamic model, the conventional wisdom on the effect of free-riding needs to be...

In this paper, we adopt the vertical differentiation duopoly framework to give a full description of firms' relocation decisions, when the removal either of trade barriers or of restrictions on capital outflows/inflows (globalization) allows them to serve the domestic market through foreign...

This paper shows that moving from market segmentation to market integration (i.e. firms can no longer discriminate among markets) may have anti-competitive effects in a repeated game setting in which a simple trigger strategy is the enforcement strategy. In particular, we show that two countries...

We use a Stackelberg differential game to model trade in renewable resources between a monopsonistic buyer and a monopolistic seller. The buyer uses unit and ad valorem tariffs to indirectly encourage conservation of the resource under study. First, we show that the efficacy of these tariffs in...