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Inefficiency in private value bargaining with naive players : an experimental study

Possajennikov, Alexandre; Saran, Rene - 2018

no equilibrium achieving full efficiency. In the experiment, we vary the proportion of naive traders by introducing … computerized players. We find that full efficiency is not achieved in the experiment with or without naive traders, and efficiency … experiment participants, and that allowing face-to-face pre-play communication increases efficiency although still not to the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011852503

A full characterization of all deterministic dominant strategy incentive compatible, ex-post individually rational, and ex-post budget balanced direct mechanisms in the public good provision problem with independent private values

Kuzmics, Christoph - 2014

In this note I give a full characterization of all deterministic direct mechanisms in the public good provision problem with independent private values that are dominant strategy incentive compatible, ex-post individually rational, and ex-post budget balanced.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010337703

On public good provision mechanisms with dominant strategies and balanced budget

Kuzmics, Christoph; Steg, Jan-Henrik - 2016

Consider a mechanism for the binary public good provision problem that is dominant strategy incentive compatible (DSIC), ex-post individually rational (EPIR), and ex-post budget balanced (EPBB). Suppose this mechanism has the additional property that the utility from participating in the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011435962

Bayesian repeated games and reputations

Forges, Françoise; Salomon, Antoine - 2014

Under appropriate assumptions (private values and uniform punishments), the Nash equilibria of a Bayesian repeated game without discounting are payoff-equivalent to tractable, completely revealing, equilibria and can be achieved as interim cooperative solutions of the initial Bayesian game. This...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010256693

Mechanism design with bounded depth of reasoning and small modeling mistakes

De Clippel, Geoffroy; Saran, Rene; Serrano, Roberto - 2014

We consider mechanism design in contexts in which agents exhibit bounded depth of reasoning (level k ) instead of rational expectations. We use simple direct mechanisms, in which agents report only first-order beliefs. While level 0 agents are assumed to be truth tellers, level k agents...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010401721

Efficiency Effects on Coalition Formation in Contests

Nevrekar, Saish - 2022

approach by assuming certain properties for the winning probability that imply efficiency gains from cooperation in contest … settings. Efficiency gains are said to be generated if any coalition experiences increasing marginal returns with aggregate … generate sufficient efficiency gains, then any equilibrium always consists of two or more coalitions where at least two …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013294669

Transparent matching mechanisms

Möller, Markus - 2024

efficiency only if they are dictatorial. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014533360

Modelling Transactions with Ultimatum Games : An Experiment on Certification

Guerra, Gerardo A. - 2003

Ultimatum games have been extensively used in experimental studies. By studying the consequences that restrictions shared by ultimatum games have in subject's behaviour, this paper argues that some results are falsified by design constraints. This paper also presents a taxonomy of certification,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014104711

A Noncooperative Foundation of the Neutral Bargaining Solution

Kim, Jin Yeub - 2017

This paper studies Myerson's neutral bargaining solution for a class of Bayesian bargaining problems in which the solution is unique. For this class of examples, I consider a noncooperative mechanism-selection game. I find that all of the interim incentive efficient mechanisms can be supported...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012971425

A Theory of Simplicity in Games and Mechanism Design

Pycia, Marek; Troyan, Peter - 2021

We introduce a general class of simplicity standards that vary the foresight abilities required of agents in extensive-form games. Rather than planning for the entire future of a game, agents are presumed to be able to plan only for those histories they view as simple from their current...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013220157