This paper reports the results of a bargaining experiment. We follow the pretrial bargaining model of Gertner and Miller (1995) under uncertainty and examine the effect of a litigation institution, called a settlement escrow and uncertainty on the timing and quality of settlement outcomes. Our...

We analyze the offering, asking, and granting of help or other benefits as a three-stage game with bilateral private information between a person in need of help and a potential help-giver. Asking entails the risk of rejection, which can be painful: since unawareness of the need can no longer be...

We analyze the offering, asking, and granting of help or other benefits as a three-stage game with bilateral private information between a person in need of help and a potential help-giver. Asking entails the risk of rejection, which can be painful: since unawareness of the need can no longer be...

We analyze the offering, asking, and granting of help or other benefits as a three-stage game with bilateral private information between a person in need of help and a potential help-giver. Asking entails the risk of rejection, which can be painful: since unawareness of the need can no longer be...

We review recent developments in neuroeconomics and their implications for economics. The paper consists of six sections. Following the Introduction, the second section enumerates the different research methods that neuroscientists use evaluates their strengths and limitations for analyzing...