We construct explicit equilibria for strategic market games used to model an economy with fiat money, one nondurable commodity, countably many time- periods, and a continuum of agents. The total production of the commodity is a random variable that fluctuates from period to period. In each...

The classical Fisher equation asserts that in a nonstochastic economy, the inflation rate must equal the difference between the nominal and real interest rates. We extend this equation to a representative agent economy with real uncertainty in which the central bank sets the nominal rate of...

The challenge of rendering monetary exchange intelligible within a Walrasian general equilibrium framework is well known. Perhaps less well known is the difficulty of integrating monetary and exchange economies in decentralized conceptions of equilibrium, of which the evenly rotating economy of...

We are constructing an imperfect competition general equilibrium model, with non-consumable money and labor market; our toolkit is an equilibrium default model of Shubik-Wilson (1978). Our result has an ‘equilibrium volatility' simultaneously occurring at all three markets: labor, goods, and...

This paper analyzes the implications of bilateral bargaining over wages and employment between a producer and a union representing a finite number of identical workers in a monetary macroeconomic model of the AS--AD type with government activity. Wages and aggregate employment levels are set...

Based on an experimental analysis of a simple monetary economy we argue that a monetary system is more stable than one would expect from individual rationality. We show that positive reciprocity stabilizes the monetary system, provided every participant considers the feedbacks of his choice to...

In a model of project design, evaluation, and selection, we explore how the incentives to improve the design of projects depend on the availability of funding and the process of evaluation. We show that project designers (researchers or NGOs) prefer to subject their projects to less-rigorous...

In this paper, we use experimental data to study players' stability in normal-form games where subjects have to report beliefs and to choose actions. Subjects saw each of 12 games four times in a regular or isomorphic form spread over two days without feedback. We document a high degree of...

This paper uses experimental data to examine the existence of a teaching strategy among bounded rational players. If players realize that their own actions modify their opponent's beliefs and actions, they might play certain actions to this specific end ; and forego immediate payoffs if the...