We examine tippy network markets that accommodate price discrimination. The analysis shows that when a mild equilibrium refinement, the monotonicity criterion, is adopted, network competition may have a unique subgame-perfect equilibrium regarding the winner's identity; the prevailing brand may...

We compare an n-firm Cournot model with a Stackelberg model, where n-firms choose outputs sequentially, in a stochastic demand environment with private information. The expected total output, consumer surplus, and total surplus are lower, while expected price and total profits are higher in...

Alliances between competitors where an established firm provides access to its marketing and distribution channels are an important real-world phenomenon. We analyze a market where an established firm, firm A, produces a product of well-known quality, and a firm with an unknown brand, firm B,...

The article proposes an evolutionary game theoretical analysis of quality and price competition in oligopoly. Using the notion of a finite population evolutionarily stable strategy (FPESS) defined by Schaffer (1989), the relative payoff maximizing behavior is compared with the absolute payoff...

We reconsider the endogenous choice of delegation to a manager by two down-stream firms in both a Cournot and a Bertrand vertical market with network effects. An upstream monopolist charges a two-part tariff for a crucial input. By applying the Nash solution in a centralized bargaining, we show...

There is growing evidence that low-quality customer service prevails in the mobile telecommunications industry. In this paper we provide theoretical support to this empirical observation by using simple game theoretical models where inefficient low-quality service levels are part of an...

There is growing evidence that low-quality customer service prevails in the mobile telecommunications industry. In this paper we provide theoretical support to this empirical observation by using simple game theoretical models where inefficient low-quality service levels are part of an...

We consider a model of price competition in a duopoly with product differentiation and network effects. The value of a good for a consumer is the sum of a common and an idiosyncratic component. The first captures the vertical dimension of quality, the second captures horizontal differentiation....

This paper extends a canonical, game-theoretic framework to examine the relationship between product differentiation and relaxed competition. In its theory, firms compete over an infinite-horizon and discount the future so that relaxed competition is feasible in equilibrium. However, firms face...