Starting with a simple economic model of the value of civil litigation from each side's perspective, this paper analyses a wide range of potential litigation cost strategies, settlement offers and negotiations, together with relevant applications and insights from game theory. Specific issues...

Decision-makers that choose information strategies instead of concrete actions elect stochastic choice rules that leave open the potential for errors, which can obfuscate the strategic interactions of players. This article establishes that dynamic, stochastic, games with rationally inattentive...

We study experimentally whether heterogeneity of behavior in the Centipede game can be interpreted as the result of a learning process of individuals with different preference types (more and less pro-social) and coarse information regarding the opponent's past behavior. We manipulate the...

We study experimentally whether heterogeneity of behavior in the Centipede game can be interpreted as the result of a learning process of individuals with different preference types (more and less pro-social) and coarse information regarding the opponent's past behavior. We manipulate the...

The application of game theory and cognitive economy to analyze the problem of undesired location - The analysts of the processes of public bodies decision - taking have long been discussing on the establishment of proper strategies to manage "environmental conflicts" - above all the so-called...

This paper deals with a class of equilibria which are based on the use of memory strategies in the context of continuous-time stochastic differential games. In order to get interpretable results, we will focus the study on a stochastic differential game model of the exploitation of one species...

We generalise the coalition structure core to partition function games. Our definition relies only on one crucial assumption, namely that there is some internal consistency in the game: residuals of the deviation play a game similar to the initial one, and - whenever this is possible - they come...

This paper strengthens the result of Sengupta and Sengupta (GEB,1996). We show that for the class of TU games with non-empty cores the core can be reached via a bounded number of proposals and counterproposals. Our result is more general than this: the boundedness holds for any two imputations...

For each outcome (i.e. a payoff vector augmented with a coalition structure) of a TU-game with a non-empty coalition structure core there exists a finite sequence of successively dominating outcomes that terminates in the coalition structure core. In order to obtain this result a restrictive...