Showing 1 - 10 of 3,301
Starting with a simple economic model of the value of civil litigation from each side's perspective, this paper analyses a wide range of potential litigation cost strategies, settlement offers and negotiations, together with relevant applications and insights from game theory. Specific issues...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014026078
I develop a model of strategic communication between an uninformed receiver and a partially informed sender who is averse to lying. The sender's cost of lying is endogenous, depending on the receiver's beliefs induced by the sender's message, rather than on its exogenous formulation. Such...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013062525
We study how subjects in an experiment use different forms of public information about their opponents' past behavior. In the absence of public information, subjects appear to use rather detailed statistics summarizing their private experiences. If they have additional public information, they...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011437784
We apply the dynamic stochastic framework proposed by recent evolutionaryliterature to the class of strict supermodular games when two simplebehavior rules coexist in the population, imitation and myopic optimization.We assume that myopic optimizers are able to see how well their payoff...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011302143
This paper considers a population of agents that are engaged in a listening network. The agents wish to match their actions to the true value of some uncertain (exogenous) parameter and to the actions of the other agents. Each agent begins with some initial information about the parameter and,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011621465
Experimental evidence shows that the rational expectations hypothesis fails to characterize the path to equilibrium after an exogenous shock when actions are strategic complements. Under identical shocks, however, repetition allows adaptive learning, so that inertia in adjustment should fade...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012842597
Experimental evidence shows that the rational expectations hypothesis fails to characterize the path to equilibrium after an exogenous shock when actions are strategic complements. Under identical shocks, however, repetition allows adaptive learning, so that inertia in adjustment should fade...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012842925
We report on experiments examining the value of commitment in Stackelberg games where the follower chooses whether to pay some cost to perfectly observe the leader's action. Várdy (2004) shows that in the unique pure strategy subgame perfect equilibrium of this game, the value of commitment is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014060286
We implement multi-sender cheap talk in the laboratory. While full-information transmission is not theoretically feasible in the standard one-sender-one- dimension model, in this setting with more senders and dimensions, full revelation is generically a robust equilibrium outcome. Our...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011798907
Inspired by the social psychology literature, we study the implications of categorical thinking on decision making in the context of a large normal form game. Every agent has a categorization (partition) of her opponents and can only observe the average behavior in each category. A strategy...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014049187