’ bid. Equilibrium behavior in the first-price auction is mostly unaffected but there are multiple equilibria in the second …- price auction. Consequently, comparative statics across price rules are equivocal. Experimentally, leaks in the first- price … auction favor second movers but harm first movers and sellers, as theoretically predicted. Low to medium leak probabilities …

first movers bids. There is a unique equilibrium in the first-price auction and multiple equilibria in the second …-price auction. Consequently, comparative statics across price rules are equivocal. We experimentally find that in the first …-price auction, leaks benefit second movers but harm first movers and sellers. Low to medium probabilities of leak eliminate the …

The theoretical literature on collusion in auctions suggests that the first-price mechanism can deter the formation of … neglects the effects of failed collusion attempts. In such contingencies, information revealed in the negotiation process is … collusion is possible, but negotiations often break down and information is revealed in an asymmetric way. The existing …

The theoretical literature on collusion in auctions suggests that the first-price mechanism can deter the formation of … neglects the effects of failed collusion attempts. In such contingencies, information revealed in the negotiation process is … collusion is possible, but negotiations often break down and information is revealed in an asymmetric way. The existing …