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Communication and hidden action : a credit market experiment

Brown, Martin; Schmitz, Jan; Zehnder, Christian - 2023

We study the impact of pre-contractual communication on market outcomes when economic relationships are subject to hidden action. Our experiment is framed in a credit market context and borrowers (second movers) can communicate with lenders (first movers) prior to entering the credit...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014301388