Using an economic bargaining game, we tested for the existence of two phenomena related to social norms, namely norm manipulation – the selection of an interpretation of the norm that best suits an individual – and norm evasion – the deliberate, private violation of a social norm. We found...

This paper models corporate tax evasion as a game among three players: tax authorities, shareholders and the manager in order to understand the behavior of corporate tax evasion (CTE), its causes and the possible mechanisms that can alleviate it. For this purpose, a three-level programming is...

In order to analyze the severity of sentencing, and to show how the probabilistic interpretation of strategic behavior can be tricky, this paper uses the crime strategic model (inspection game) proposed by Tsebelis. This model shows that any attempts to increase the severity of punishment will...

We study the strategic interactions between the fiscal authority and the taxpayer regarding tax evasion and auditing. We fit this interaction into a Bayesian game and introduce the concept of behavioral consistency, which helps reducing the number of available strategies and models the stylized...

Underlying this work is the idea that there is a problem of strategic complementarity of individuals who choose to evade, which results from the discretionary policies of governments and the strategic implications of the Studi di Settore (Sector Studies), the mechanism used in Italy to evaluate...

Laws express rules of conduct ('obligations') enforced by the means of penalties and rewards ('incentives'). The role of incentives in shaping individual behaviour has been largely analysed in the traditional economic literature. On the contrary, very little is known about the specific role of...