This paper studies equilibrium uniqueness in multi-asset noisy rational expectations economies with asymmetric information, an extension of Grossman and Stiglitz (1980). We show the existence of a linear equilibrium, and prove its uniqueness among equilibria with any continuous price function....

Delegation bears an intrinsic form of uncertainty. Investors hire managers for their superior models of asset markets, but delegation outcome is uncertain precisely because managers' model is unknown to investors. We model investors' delegation decision as a trade-off between asset return...

We use a model with agency frictions to analyze the structure of a dealer market that faces competition from a crossing network. Traders are privately informed about their types (e.g. their portfolios), which is something the dealer must take into account when engaging his counterparties....

Recent financial studies often assume agents have Epstein and Zin (1989) preferences, preferences which require agents to care about when uncertainty is resolved. Under this “recursive-preference” framework, the preference for uncertainty resolution is entirely determined by an agent's...

We consider a market economy where two rational agents are able to learn the distribution of future events. In this context, we study whether moving away from the standard Bayesian belief updating, in the sense of under-reaction to some degree to new information, may be strategically convenient...

Rational expectations equilibria (REE) assume that the ex post equilibrium price function is able to reveal ex ante information. This paper drops the assumption of information revealing prices and instead constructs an internal reasoning process through which highly rational price-takers can...

In a financial market where agents trade for short-term profit and where news can increase the uncertainty of the public belief, there are strategic complementarities in the acquisition of private information and, if the cost of information is sufficiently small, a continuum of equilibrium...

We consider the general problem of a set of agents trading a portfolio of assets in the presence of transient price impact and additional quadratic transaction costs and we study, with analytical and numerical methods, the resulting Nash equilibria. Extending significantly the framework of...

Investors' Exchange LLC (IEX) is a newly approved public exchange that is designed to discourage aggressive high-frequency trading. We explain how IEX differs from traditional continuous double auction markets and present summary data on IEX transactions by trader class and or- der type. Our...