In this paper we analyze the dynamics of an R&D differential game allowing for technological spillovers and sigmoid learning functions of multiproduct oligopolies. We demonstrate how the presence of learning together with spillovers may generate a rich set of outcomes, varying from constant...

We examine innovation as a market-entry timing game with complete information and observable actions. We allow for heterogenous payoffs between players, and for a leader's payoff functions to be multi-peaked and non-monotonic. Assuming that the follower's payoff is non-increasing with the time...

In this paper we analyze the dynamics of an R&D differential game allowing for technological spillovers and sigmoid learning functions of multiproduct oligopolies. We demonstrate how the presence of learning together with spillovers may generate a rich set of outcomes, varying from constant...

We examine innovation as a timing game with complete information and observable actions in which firms decide when to enter a market. We characterize all pure strategy subgame perfect equilibria for the two-player symmetric game. In particular, we describe all subgame perfect equilibria when...

Using real options game models, we consider the characterization of strategic equilibria associated with an asymmetric R&D race between an incumbent firm and an entrant firm in the development of a new innovative product under market and technological uncertainties. The random arrival time of...

Firms tend to compete more aggressively in financial distress; the intensified competition in turn reduces profit margins for everyone, pushing some further into distress. To study such feedback and contagion effects, we incorporate dynamic strategic competition into an industry equilibrium with...

This is the supplemental material to the paper titled "Feedback and Contagion through Distressed Competition." It includes additional empirical, theoretical, and quantitative results. It also includes illustration for the numerical algorithm for our model solution

We examine innovation in an $n$-player market-entry timing game with complete information and observable actions. In our novel multi-player setup, we allow for heterogeneous payoffs between players and for a leader's payofffunctions to be multi-peaked and non-monotonic, only requiring that...

Firms tend to compete more aggressively in financial distress; the intensified competition in turn reduces profit margins, pushing themselves further into distress and adversely affecting other firms. To study such feedback and contagion effects, we incorporate strategic competition into a...