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Comment on McLennan and Sonnenschein "Sequential bargaining as a noncooperative foundation for Walrasian equilibrium"

Dagan, Nir; Serrano, Roberto; Volij, Oscar - In: Econometrica : journal of the Econometric Society, an … 66 (1998) 5, pp. 1231-1233

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001249584

Computation of equilibria in finite games

McKelvey, Richard D.; McLennan, Andrew - 1996

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001328186

Sequential bargaining as a noncooperative foundation for Walrasian equilibrium

McLennan, Andrew - In: Econometrica : journal of the Econometric Society, an … 59 (1991) 5, pp. 1395-1424

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001113278

On the generic finiteness of equilibrium outcome distributions in game forms

Govindan, Srihari; McLennan, Andrew - In: Econometrica : journal of the Econometric Society, an … 69 (2001) 2, pp. 455-471

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001566250

On the generic finiteness of equilibrium outcome distributions in game forms

Govindan, Srihari; McLennan, Andrew - 1997

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000968480

Chapter 2 Computation of equilibria in finite games

McKelvey, Richard D.; McLennan, Andrew - In: Handbook of computational economics : volume 1, (pp. 87-142). 1996

This chapter provides an overview of the latest state of the art of methods for numerical computation of Nash equilibria and refinements of Nash equilibria for general finite n -person games. The appropriate method for computing Nash equilibria for a game depends on a number of factors. The...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014024337