We investigate situations in which players make costly contributions as group members in a group conflict, and at the … asymmetry and complementarity in members'efforts, and analyze how each group's internal conflict in-fluences its chance of … winning in the external conflict. We find that a more symmetric group may expend more effort in external conflict when the …

We investigate situations in which players make costly contributions as group members in a group conflict, and at the … asymmetry and complementarity in members' efforts, and analyze how each group's internal conflict influences its chance of … winning in the external conflict. We find that a more symmetric group may expend more effort in external conflict when the …

We experimentally test the social motives behind individual participation in intergroup conflict by manipulating the … framing and symmetry of conflict. We find that behavior in conflict depends on whether one is harmed by actions perpetrated by … to do what is good for the group and contribute to the conflict. On the other hand, if people perceive to be personally …

We study how conflict in contest games is influenced by rival parties being groups and by group members being able to … punish each other. Our motivation stems from the analysis of socio-political conflict. The theoretical prediction is that … conflict expenditures are independent of group size and of whether punishment is available or not. We find, first, that …

ways of extending the standard static economic model of conflict to study patterns of conflict dynamics. It turns out that …. In particular, we are unable to study dynamic military conflict as a series of “battles” that are resolved individually … subject to this limitation. Plausible patterns of conflict dynamics emerge, which we can link to both historical conflict and …