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This paper develops a positive model of informal contracting in which rewards and punishments are not determined by an ex ante optimal plan but instead express the ex post moral sentiments of the arbitrating party. We consider a subjective performance evaluation problem in which a principal can...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011671838
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mechanism's robustness is explored in further experiments. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009765609
Principal-agent models in which the agent has access to private information before a contract is signed are a cornerstone of contract theory. We have conducted an experiment with 720 participants to explore whether the theoretical insights are reflected by the behavior of subjects in the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014162484
This paper studies the role of autonomy and reciprocity in explaining control averse responses in principal-agents interactions. While most of the social psychology literature emphasizes the role of autonomy, recent economic research has provided an alternative explanation based on reciprocity....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011308435
We use economic experiments to examine the nature of relational trading under a menu of incomplete contracts ranging …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013316957
We enrich the choice task of responders in ultimatum games by allowing them to independently decide whether to collect what is offered to them and whether to destroy what the proposer demanded. Such a multidimensional response format intends to cast further light on the motives guiding responder...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010395127
decision makers in the family and the society. We test these alternative hypotheses running Dictators experiments in Italy, a …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010488294
By now there is substantial experimental evidence that people make use of "moral wiggle room" (Dana et al., 2007), that is, they tend to exploit moral excuses for selfish behavior. However, this evidence is limited to dictator games. In our experiment, a trust game variant, we study whether...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011446176
We analyze reciprocal behavior when moral wiggle room exists. Dana et al. (2007) show that giving in a dictator game is only partly due to distributional preferences as the giving rate drops when situational excuses for selfish behavior are provided. Our binary trust game closely follows their...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011576929