In this paper we consider one-to-many matching problems where the preferences of the agents involved are represented by … matching to a matching of maximum total reward, one can always provide a compensation schedule that will be ex-post stable in … uses the fact that the core of an associated compensation matching game with constraints is nonempty. …

observed outcomes are stable, and among those a large majority culminate at the receiver-optimal stable matching. Second …

We consider the problem of matching a set of medical students to a set of medical residency positions (hospitals) under …

Matching markets can be unstable when individuals prefer to be matched to a partner who also wants to be matched with … preferences exist, significantly decrease stability in matching markets, and are driven both by belief-based and preference …

paper, we introduce and formalize reciprocal preferences, apply them to matching markets, and analyze the implications for … acceptance mechanism can achieve stability. These results provide insights into non-standard preferences in matching markets, and …

Manipulability is a threat to the successful design of centralized matching markets. However, in many applications some … number of agents with an incentive to manipulate and rank mechanisms by their level of manipulability. This ranking sheds a …