This note analyzes in a fishery management problem the effects of relaxing one of the usual assumptions in the literature of dynamic games. Specifically, the assumption that players restrict to strategies that stabilize the system. Previous works in the literature have shown that feedback Nash...

In this paper, intraseasonal fishing is modeled as a differential game between fishermen in a total allowable catch-regulated fishery with and without individual fishing quotas (IFQs). Heterogeneous harvest values are included by incorporating time-specific harvest costs and a stock effect into...

In this paper we study an extension of the linear production game (LPG) introduced by Owen (1975). We discuss LPG with players who have flexible resources. Here, flexibility means that a player has a universal resource (e.g. working time) which he can split up (e.g. to execute different tasks)....

Morton and Wecker (1977) stated that the value iteration algorithm solves a dynamic program's policy function faster than its value function when the limiting Markov chain is ergodic. I show that their proof is incomplete, and provide a new proof of this classic result. I use this result to...

Fisheries economics stand on the cusp of potentially sizeable changes in orientation and policy focus, leading in turn to comparable changes in modeling and general analysis. Notably, fisheries are increasingly framed as part of the overall marine environment rather than considered as solely or...

International agreements are necessary for exclusion of non-cooperative behavior. We parameterized an age-structured model for the North Sea herring fishery. The reference points of the current harvest control rule operationalize the precautionary approach. Applying the precautionary approach by...

In this paper the management of straddling fish stocks is approached through a coalition game in partition function form. A two-stage game is applied, assuming ex ante symmetric players and the classical Gordon-Schaefer bioeconomic model. It is shown that the game is characterized by positive...

From a game theoretical perspective, a prerequisite for an international fishery agreement (IFA) to be stable is that parties expect their benefits from joining the agreement to exceed the benefits from free riding on the agreement, and parties only comply with the agreement as long as this is...

Risk of stock collapse is a genuine motivation for cooperative fisheries management. We analyse the effect of an endogenously determined risk of stock collapse on the incentives to cooperate in a Great Fish War model. We establish that equilibrium harvest strategies are non-linear in stock and...

Many economic problems can be formulated as dynamic games in which strategically interacting agents choose actions that determine the current and future levels of a single capital stock. We study necessary conditions that allow us to characterize Markov perfect Nash equilibria (MPNE) for these...