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games arise in job markets, research and development, electoral competition, security analysis, and conflict resolution. For …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012436059
This paper studies a contest in which players with unobservable types may form an alliance in a pre-stage of the game … effort choice in the contest and there exist equilibria in which all types prefer to form an alliance. If the formation of an …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010487967
This paper studies a contest in which players with unobservable types may form an alliance in a pre-stage of the game … effort choice in the contest and there exist equilibria in which all types prefer to form an alliance. If the formation of an …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013025736
When are comparative statements credible? For instance, when can a professor rank different students for an employer, or a stock analyst rank different stocks for a client? We show that simple complementarity conditions ensure that an expert with private information about multiple issues can...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014029348
Noting that a full characterization of Nash-implementation is given using a canonical-mechanism and Maskin's theorem (Maskin, 1999) is shown using a mechanism with Saijo's type of strategy space reduction (Saijo, 1988), this paper fully characterizes the class of Nash-implementable social choice...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014195916
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002071407
In a society composed of a ruler and its citizens: what are the determinants of the political equilibrium between these two? This paper approaches this problem as a game played between a ruler who has to decide the distribution of the aggregate income and a group of agents/citizens who have the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011600156
The literature on imperfectly discriminating contests has almost exclusively focused on complete information. We study such contests assuming players have private information. We identify a general class of imperfectly discriminating contests for which findings by Athey (2001) imply the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013069614
low effort cost). Before the game starts, the designer of a contest with the unknown task can commit to (1) fully disclose … the task type or to (2) keep it private in order to maximize the aggregate effort exerted in her competition. When the … become linked, and there is a substitution effect which forces the players to reallocate their effort to a competition they …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013212097
contest is unfair regardless of disclosure decisions. Under this condition, full revelation is the unique perfect Bayesian … equilibrium outcome of the contest with pre-play communication. This is so because the weakest type of the underdog will try to … moderate the favorite, while the strongest type of the favorite will try to discourage the underdog - so that the contest …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011805749