I develop new results on uniqueness and comparative statics of equilibria in the Crawford and Sobel (1982) strategic information transmission game. For a class of utility functions, I demonstrate that logconcavity of the density implies uniqueness of equilibria inducing a given number of...

In this paper, we investigate the classical Axelrod model of cultural dissemination under an adaptive network framework. Unlike the original model, we place agents on a complex network, where they cut connections with any agent that does not share at least one cultural trait. This rewiring...

In this paper, I suggest a new experimental method for measuring (dis)honest information transmission. Subjects play a variant of the dictator game in which the dictator’s decision whether to lie (either to or against his advantage) or whether to be honest, when communicating private...

Many everyday activities are habitual. Among the most common human activities is communication. If people primarily communicate in a common-interests environment, they may form habits of truth-telling and believing messages. If they primarily communicate in a conflicting-interests environment,...

As the complexity of financial markets keeps growing, so does the need to understand the decision-making and the coordination of the exsuing actions in the marketplace. In particular, the disclosure of information to market participants and its impact on the market outcome mertis attention. This...

We consider an e-tailer's upstream supplier who wants to encroach into retailing to earn additional revenue. The supplier needs to decide whether or not to enter the retail market by either selling to consumers on an e-tailer's platform by paying commission fees (agency encroachment) or opening...