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The Athenian Trierarchy : Mechanism Design for the Private Provision of Public Goods

Kaiser, Brooks - 2015

The liturgical system in Classical Athens (479-322 BCE) privately provided public goods, including naval defense. I use it to evaluate mechanism design policies and to address uncertainties in the historical record by adding predictive economic theory to research by ancient historians. I...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013028940

Historical self-governance and norms of cooperation

Rustagi, Devesh - 2022

Does self-governance, a hallmark of democratic societies, foster or erode norms of generalized cooperation? Does this effect persist, and if so, why? I investigate these questions using a natural experiment in Switzerland. In the middle-ages, the absence of an heir resulted in the extinction of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012822061

The Rationality of Revolution

Dudley, Leonard M. - 2000

Between 950 and 1950, European states experienced four short intervals of rapid social, political and economic change. Each such period followed the introduction of a macroinvention in information and communication technology. Here these two sets of events are linked by a rational theory of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014153376

Incentives dominate selection : chamber-changing legislators are driven by electoral rules and voter preferences

Portmann, Marco; Stadelmann, David; Eichenberger, Reiner - 2019

The role of electoral incentives vs. selection is ideally analyzed in a setting where the same legislators are selected to decide on policies under different electoral rules and where voter preferences on policies can be precisely measured. This is the first paper to look at such a situation....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012286323

Voting for voters: A model of electoral evolution

Barberà, Salvador; Maschler, Michael B.; Shalev, Jonathan - 1998

periods and holds elections at the beginning of each period; one vote is sufficient for admission, and voters can support as …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011608403

Focused power : experiments, the Shapley-Shubik power index, and focal points

Geller, Chris R.; Mustard, Jamie; Shahwan, Ranya - 2013

values. The SSPI can serve as a control for power imbedded in voting blocs, permitting fuller analysis of other factors that …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009789971

Sequential voting in large elections with multiple candidates

Hummel, Patrick - In: Journal of public economics 96 (2012) 3/4, pp. 341-348

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009699594

Altruistic punishment in elections

Aimone, Jason A.; Butera, Luigi; Stratmann, Thomas - 2014

between two potential policy outcomes of an election participate in large-scale elections when voting is costly? Using a … understanding of this form of costly punishment to help explain a puzzle of voting behavior: why do people who are indifferent … simple voting experiment, we show that many voters are willing to engage in voting as a form of punishment, even when voting …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010393636

A case for standard theory?

Kuzmics, Christoph; Rodenburger, Daniel - 2015

Using data from an experiment by Forsythe, Myerson, Rietz, and Weber (1993), designed for a different purpose, we test the "standard theory" that players have preferences only over their own mentary payoffs and that play will be in (evolutionary stable) equilibrium. In the experiment each...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011284229

Who runs? : honesty and self-selection into politics

Fehrler, Sebastian; Fischbacher, Urs; Schneider, Maik T. - 2016

We examine the incentives to self-select into politics and how they depend on the transparency of the entry process. To this end, we set up a two-stage political competition model and test its key mechanisms in the lab. At the entry stage, potential candidates compete in a contest to become...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011543745