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In this paper the concepts of manipulation as strategic voting (misrepresentation of true preferences) and strategic nomination (by adding, or removing alternatives) are investigated. The connection between Arrow’s and Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorems is discussed from the viewpoint of dilemma...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010529891
well, including those in which voters vote informatively. -- efficient information aggregation ; simple plurality rule …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009127595
information aggregation. Despite this, unanimity is frequently used in committees making decisions on behalf of society. This …, unanimity can facilitate truthful communication and optimal information aggregation. Theoretically, we show that since agents …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011696383
We design an experiment to test how voters vote in a small committee election with three alternatives. Voters have common preferences that depend on an unknown state of nature. Each voter receives an imprecise private signal prior to the election and then casts a vote. The alternative with the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012061937
We investigate whether the simple plurality rule aggregates information efficiently in a large election with three alternatives. The environment is the same as in the Condorcet Jury Theorem (Condorcet (1785)). Voters have common preferences that depend on the unknown state of nature, and they...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013316013
contribution to the literature on social choice as it provides an innovative aggregation rule that satisfies independence for … sufficiently many issues and has a game-form representation which implies that dictatorial aggregation rules can be “democratized … judgemental issues, or ranking pairs of alternatives, an alternative to the simultaneous Arrovian aggregation functions are …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013313903
Acyclicity of individual preferences is a minimal assumption in social choice theory. We replace that assumption by the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014180111
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000983578
We study dominant strategy implementation especially in economic environments. We first showthat in general environments, strategy-proofness and quasi-strong-non-bossiness together are necessary and sufficient for dominant strategy implementation via the associated direct revelationmechanism. We...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003371461
Consider a society with a finite number of individuals. A coalition structure is a partition of the set of individuals. Each individual has personal preferences over the set of all coalition structures. We study the strategy proof core and von Neumann and Morgenstern (vN&M) solutions. A roommate...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011577015