This paper develops a model where players acquire information personally or by forming connections and the benefits that reach them depend only on the maximum of the information collected personally or by neighbours. As long as only direct connections matter periphery sponsored star is the only...

This paper introduces a new mechanism through which positive externality spills over in a network. We find that the introduction of the new spillover mechanism plays a major role in reducing the set of Nash equilibrium though at the same time it increases the set of stable equilibria in a...

The video games industry has been subject to a number of significant transitions in its short history. The current transition, however, has the potential to restructure more fundamentally the technological, competitive and market dynamics with a growing share of revenues attributed to...

Modern software development involves collaborative efforts and re-use of existing software packages and libraries, to reduce the cost of developing new software. However, package dependencies expose developers to the risk of contagion from bugs or other vulnerabilities. We study the formation of...

This paper investigates the effects of neighborhood size and network structure on strategic experimentation. We analyze a multi-arm bandit game with one safe and two risky alternatives. In this setting, risk taking produces a learning externality and an opportunity for free riding. We conduct a...

We develop a dynamic framework of strategic information transmission through cheap talk in a social network. Privately informed agents have different preferences about the action to be implemented by each agent and repeatedly communicate with their neighbors in the network. We first characterize...

We combine network formation and information transmission in a simple model and predict that people reveal less information when talking to those with a different identity. Furthermore, individuals prefer to talk to people with the same identity when there is a greater incentive to collect...

We investigate the role of conflicting interests in a boundedly rational model of belief dynamics. Individuals have different preferences about the action to take, are subject to persuasion bias and repeatedly communicate with their neighbors in a social network. They communicate strategically...